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COMMENTS

STRICT LIABILITY AND STATE OF
THE ART EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Strict product liability is an area of ever increasing importance.
Strict product liability is used to find a defendant manufacturer liable
for an injury caused by a product regardless of the defendant's
conduct. A plaintiff does not have to show that the defendant's
conduct is involved. A plaintiff must show only that the defendant's
product is "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property."' This comment will explore the
treatment in Illinois of two possible defenses to strict product liability,
undiscoverable risk and unknowable risk. Illinois, in the Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital decision 2 disallowed the defense of
undiscoverable risk. However, Illinois does allow the defense of
unknowable risk. 3 This comment will argue Illinois would be better
served to apply the Cunningham decision to unknowable risk and
disallow the use of unknowable risk as a defense.
In our modern era technology is advancing so quickly that often
a product is put on the market, for ordinary consumers, before the
product's true long-range effects on humans and the environment are
fully known. A good example of a defective product's long-range
effect on humans and the environment is DDT. Once thought to be
a miracle insecticide, DDT was later found to be harmful to humans
and the environment. 4 A more timely example of a product's longrange effect on humans is found in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp.' In the Wells case an infant was harmed by its mother's use of
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).
2. See infra note 48 and accompanying test.
3. See infra note 84 and accompanying test.
4. DDT is an abbreviation of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, an insecticide.
The insecticide was widely used form World War II until the 1960's. Severe restrictions
were placed on the use of DDT in the United States in 1972. IIl Encyclopedia
Britannica Micropaedia 411 (15th ed. 1981).
5. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
55 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1986) (No. 86-513).
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a spermicide manufactured by the defendant Ortho. As a result of
the use of the spermicide the infant was born with massive birth
defects. The mother sued under a theory of strict product liability
and received substantial damages.
Another rather frightening example of a defective product's effect
on humans is the possibility of a person being exposed to the AIDS 6
virus through a blood transfusion. 7 In the DDT or the AIDS examples,
a plaintiff may have to rely on a theory of strict product liability to
gain a recovery for damages due to the insecticide or virus. Strict
product liability may have to be relied upon in such circumstances
because a negligence theory of recovery may be unavailable to the
plaintiff. In the AIDS example the blood may have been properly
handled and tested but unfortunately it may be impossible for the test
or procedures available to be one-hundred percent effective in protecting the potential plaintiff from exposure to the virus. A plaintiff
may be infected by AIDS or poisoned by DDT despite the lack of
any negligent action by the defendant.
Within the theory of strict liability a product can be defective in
three ways. First, the product can be mismanufactured. A manufacturing defect would render a particular product different from the
manufacturer's intended design or form.' Second, the defect could be
in the design of the product, where the manufacturer's scheme or
design of the product itself is at fault. 9 Finally, the product might be
defective because of a lack of a warning or proper operating instructions. ' 0
Within the theory of strict liability has arisen the concept of state
of the art evidence. State of the art evidence can be used in some
situations as a defense to a strict product liability claim, and can be
6. AIDS is an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. The
disease attacks and disables parts of the human immune system rendering the victim
susceptible to several fatal diseases. Leonard, Employment DiscriminationAgainst
Persons With AIDS, 10 U. Dayton L. Rev. 681 (1985).
7. The situation of an infection through a blood transfusion is directly
analogous to Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, see infra note 48 and
accompanying text.The viral agent of AIDS is capable of being transmitted through
a blood transfusion. K. Mayer & H. Pizer, The AIDS Fact Book 36-40 (1983).
8. Quite simply, the product is put together incorrectly, it is a "lemon," and
as a result is "unreasonably dangerous."
9. The plaintiff in a misdesign case claims that the way the product was
designed makes the product "unreasonably dangerous."
10. In a lack of proper warning case the plaintiff claims that the lack of proper
operating instructions and or warnings rendered the product "unreasonably dangerous."
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used in several different forms. One of the common uses of state of

the art evidence is in the realm of customary practice within an
industry." Within this area state of the art evidence takes the form
of industry practices. A defendant manufacturer may attempt to show
that his actions conform with that particular industry's practice. Thus,
the defendant claims that conforming with industry practices constitutes a defense to a strict product liability claim. 12
Government standards may also be claimed by the defendant to

constitute state of the art evidence. As such, compliance with governmental standards has been treated either as a complete defense to a

strict liability claim'3 or as a prima facie evidence that the product is
not defective. 14 Finally, as is the case in Illinois, the use of government
standards as state of the art evidence may be treated merely as another

item of evidence to be presented to the jury. 5

11. See Spradely, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products

Liability, 67 MINN. L. REV. 343, 350-67 (1982).
12. See generally, Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New
Look at an Old "Defense" 4 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 249, 261 (1977). When industry
practices are used as state of the art evidence for a defense, all the defendant claims
is that he should not be found liable because all the other manufacturers in the
industry do business in the same fashion as the defendant.
13. Raleigh, supra note 12, at 258. In this situation the defendant would want
to introduce compliance with a government standard regulating the defendant's
business as a complete defense.
14. Jones v. Hittle Service, 549 P.2d 1383, 1390 (1976).The court in Jones
admitted evidence of the defendant's compliance with a regulation as a prima facie
showing of due care. In the Jones case three members of the Jones family were badly
burned and died as a result of a propane gas explosion. Propane gas accumulated as
a result of a leak in an underground pipeline in the Jones' storm cellar. On an errand
to the cellar one of the three victims lit a cigarette and ignited the gas. One of the
Jones' claims was that the propane contained an insufficient amount of odorizer,
propane is odorless, to warn of its presence. The court in Jones found that the
defendants were not liable by reason of the insufficient odorizer claim. The court
found that the defendants had complied with the statutory minimum amount of
odorizer, set by the Kansas Fire Marshall. The Jones court declared that compliance
with a regulation is admissible as evidence of due care and "may be conclusive in
the absence of a showing of special circumstances." In the Jones case the plaintiffs
failed to present enough evidence to convince the court of the existence of "special
circumstances," and the plaintiffs could not overcome the defendant's prima facie
evidence of due care.
15. Rucker v. Norfolk, 77 Ill. 2d 434, 439-40, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979). The
court in Rucker allowed the defendant's compliance with a federal standard to be
admitted merely as an item of evidence without any added probative weight. In the
Rucker case Clyde Rucker was killed when a boxcar collided with a liquified petroleum
gas (LPG) tank car in a Decatur switching yard. Rucker's widow, Marcia, alleged
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The defendant may argue "feasibility" as state of the art evidence. That is, the defendant may claim that the plaintiff's alternate
design, 16 warning, or manufacturing process may be possible yet the
particular alternate is not feasible because it is too costly or would
seriously restrict the product's usefulness.17
Finally, state of the art evidence may be claimed as a defense in
that the available knowledge or technology necessary to thwart the
risk simply does not exist. In short, it is impossible for the defendant
to avoid the defect, so it would be unfair to find the defendant
liable." s This state of the art defense of "impossibility" may take
three different forms. First, the defense of undiscoverable risk, in
which the defendant may claim the risk of harm was undiscoverable
by present knowledge or without destroying the product itself. 9
Second, this state of the art defense may be used by the defendant to
claim that a design change, which may have averted the risk of harm,
20
was simply impossible with available technology and knowledge.
that defendant GATX, the manufacturer of the tank car, should have manufactured
the tank car with a headshield. GATX was allowed to admit evidence showing that
at the time GATX manufactured the tank car it comported with Federal Regulations.
However, the court did not allow GATX's contention that compliance with the
Federal standard should bar a finding of manufacturer liability, rather the court held
that compliance was merely evidence relevant to the issue of the unreasonable
dangerousness of the defective product.
16. The plaintiff must supply an alternate design as part of his prima facie case
to sustain a strict products liability claim of defective design. Jones, 549 P.2d at
1390. In the Jones case (see infra note 14) the misdesign which allegedly rendered
the product defective and "unreasonably dangerous" was the inadequate odorization
of the propane gas. The plaintiff presented an expert witness who offered several
alternate levels of odorization for the gas.
17. This use of feasibility as a state of the art defense closely mirrors negligence.
The defendant would be claiming she exercised reasonable care in designing the
vehicle and that is all that can be asked, thus the court would be focusing on the
defendant's conduct as in negligence. Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495, 502
(8th Cir. 1968).
18. Spradely, supra note 11, at 379.
19. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 111. 2d 443, 453-54, 266
N.E.2d 897, 901 (1970).
20. In a strict liability claim of misdesign the plaintiff will claim that the design
was improper and the plaintiff must supply an alternate design. A defendant could
claim as a defense that the alternate design, offered by the plaintiff, is technically
"impossible" or "infeasible". The technical impossibility of the alternate design area
is difficult to distinguish from the feasibility of the alternate design area (Spradely,
supra note 11, at 398-411). An example of the meshing of the two areas is the
dilemma over the time at which an alternate design is "possible"; when the alternate
design is theoretically possible, when the alternate design has been accomplished in
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Finally, the defense of unknowable risk, in which the manufacturer
will claim that a warning about the risk was impossible because the
2
defect's existence was unknowable given current knowledge. 1
II.

HISTORY OF STRICT LIABILITY

In viewing the history of strict liability it becomes apparent that
the theory was created as a result of public policy. In the first cases
involving strict liability the theory was used to protect consumers
against unsafe food. This trend of strict product liability expanded
from the first food cases to encompass any defective product.
Dean Prosser 22 has traced strict liability as far back as 1431 .23 At
that time strict liability took the form of an implied warranty on a
"seller of food." Little change occurred in strict liability until the
early 20th century when there was an explosion of concern over
defective food.2 4 The concerns over defective food led to a major
expansion of strict liability. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. ,25
Justice Cardozo effectively removed the privity of contract 26 barrier
the laboratory, when the alternate design can be implemented by industry, or when
the alternate design is economically "feasible". Because of the meshing of the possible
uses of state of the art evidence of "impossibility" and of "feasibility" of a design
change, as a defense, this area will not be a topic of this comment.
However, to the extent that Illinois has taken a position on how the Illinois
courts should treat the alternate design area, one of the key cases is Stanfield v.
Medalist Industries, (see infra note 94 and accompanying text). The Stanfield court
found evidence on "impossibility" of an alternate design to be pertinent to the
conduct of the manufacturer and thus irrelevant to a strict liability case.
21. In the Woodill decision (see infra note 84) a defendant manufacturer
successfully claimed that he should not be held liable for failing to warn about a
defect, in his product, of which it was impossible for him to have known about.
22. Dean, School of Law, University of California (Berkeley), (b. March 15,
1898 d. May 21, 1972). 8 The Guide to American Law 334 (1984).
23. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1104 (1960).
24. This rise in concern over unwholesome food was fueled by "muckrackers"
and by such books as "The Jungle" by Upton Sinclair.
25. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In
MacPherson the plaintiff bought an auto from a car dealer who had purchased the
vehicle from Buick. Unfortunately, one of the wheels of the vehicle was defective
and it collapsed upon use of the vehicle. The plaintiff, MacPherson, sued Buick, the
manufacturer, for damages and was successful.
26. Privity of contract restricts who may sue on a contract to the parties to the
contract. In other words, if A sold a bike to B and C rode the bike and was injured
as a result of a defect in the bike, C would not be able to sue A for his injuries. C
would not be in "privity" with A. See, e.g., Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947) (the defendant manufacturer attempted to
use "privity" as a defense to a claim brought by a plaintiff not in privity; the
-plaintiff had purchased the defendant's product from a retailer).
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to strict liability claims.2 7 Dean Prosser described Cardozo's action in
MacPherson in a colorful manner, "Cardozo wielding a mighty axe,
burst over the ramparts, and buried the general rule ["privity rule"]
under the exception. 'If the nature of a thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger'. ' 2 Thus, Cardozo created a larger
area for strict liability to roam by removing the fences of privity.

The history of strict liability in Illinois has taken the same path

as in other jurisdictions. Strict liability was first used in Illinois in

response to the need to protect consumers against unwholesome
food.

29

As early as 1897, in Wiedeman v. Keller,30 Illinois had applied

strict liability, in protecting consumers against unwholesome food, to

find a defendant liable without a finding of any negligent conduct by
the defendant. In Wiedeman, Anna Wiedeman purchased a quantity
of pork from Henry Keller, a butcher. That same evening Anna
cooked the pork for her family and "her said family were made ill,
disordered and diseased, etc." 3 Anna sued Henry and the court ruled
in Anna's favor, finding that Henry had violated a special implied

warranty' for the fitness of meats for human consumption which
32
extended from a retail seller of meats to the immediate purchaser.

While the Wiedeman special warranty's effectiveness was still
limited by privity,33 Illinois fully adopted the theory of strict liability

27. MacPherson, Il1 N.E. at 1053. Justice Cardozo in MacPherson stated, "If
to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of
contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully." (emphasis added).
28. Prosser, supra note 23, at 1100.
29. See Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897).
30. Id.
31. Wiedeman, 171 Ill. at 93, 49 N.E. at 210.
32. Wiedeman, 171 Ill. at 98-99, 49 N.E. at 211. The court in Wiedeman stated
that a sale to ". . .a dealer or middleman who buys on the market, not for
consumption, but for sale to others," would destroy the warranty. Id. at 98, 49 N.E.
at 211.
33. Even before the Suvada decision, Illinois had adopted the position of the
MacPherson court and abolished privity as a bar to a defective product claim versus
a manufacturer. Two of the key Illinois cases abolishing the "privity rule" were:
Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 I11.507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934) (Nathan Rotche was
able to get a judgement versus the Buick Motor Co., although he had bought his
defective vehicle from a dealer); and, Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 I11. 121, 94
N.E.2d 847 (1950) (Bruce Lindroth was able to sustain an action versus the manufacturer of a defective electric vaporizer, although Mr. Lindroth had purchased the
vaporizer from a retail store).
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in tort in Suvada v. White Motor Co. 3 4 In Suvada the plaintiff, Steven

Suvada, was a milkman in Cook County. Steven bought a used truck
from White Motor Co. The brake system for the truck failed and

Steven's truck struck a bus. Steven not only sued White Motor Co.

but also Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., the man-

ufacturer of the milk truck's brake system. Steven was successful in
recovering damages from both defendants. The court in Suvada held
that, "[Tioday negligence is no longer necessary [to find a defendant

manufacturer liable for an injury caused by a defective product]." 35
Also, the court in Suvada held that a holding in strict liability made
the privity question irrelevant.16

The trend towards strict product liability was started as a result
of public policy.3 7 In the early food cases the court imposed strict
liability to protect public health and safety.3" The court also felt the
losses caused by defective food should be the responsibility of the
creator of the risk as well as the person in the best position to prevent
the risk.3 9 In addition, the manufacturer cultivates use of his product
through advertising and packaging, representing that the product is
wholesome, therefore the manufacturer should be responsible for any
damage caused by his product. 40
The court in Suvada applied these same policy reasons for

imposing strict liability in the "food" cases when imposing strict
liability in a dispute involving an automobile. The court concluded
that the same policy reasons apply for the imposition of strict liability
on any defective product. 4' That is, as long as a defective condition

34. 32 I11.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
35. Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
36. Id. at 622, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
37. Id. at 618-19, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The court in Suvada recognized "that
public policy is the primary factor for imposing strict liability on the seller and
manufacturer of food in favor of the injured consumer."
38. Wiedeman, 171 Ill. at 99, 49 N.E. at 211. The court stated, "public safety
demands that there should be an implied warranty on the part of the vendor that the
article sold is sound, and fit for the use for which it was purchased."
39. Id. The court stated, "in the sale of provisions the vendor has so many
more facilities for ascertaining the soundness or unsoundness of the article offered
for sale, which are not possessed by the purchaser, that it is much safer to hold the
vendor liable than it would be to compel the purchaser to assume the risk."
40. The Texas Supreme Court in Decker v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 614, 164
S.W.2d 828, 833 (1942), gives an excellent recitation of the "manufacturer advertising" policy rationale for finding an opportunity to hold a manufacturer liable for a
defective product.
41. Suvada, 32 I11.
2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The court concluded that
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policy
makes a product "unreasonably dangerous to the user," ' 442
3
considerations should allow the imposition of strict liability.
III.

UNDISCOVERABLE RISK

Illinois does not allow the state of the art defense of undiscoverable risk in a strict liability case. As a result, Illinois protects the
innocent consumer while also providing legislative exceptions to strict
liability to protect necessary and beneficial products such as blood.
This position was adopted by the court in Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hospital" and has been followed by subsequent Illinois
decision has been
decisions despite the fact that the Cunningham
45
states.
other
in
courts
some
by
heavily criticized
State of the art evidence of an undiscoverable risk is usually
pertinent to a manufacturing defect strict liability case. 46 An undiscoverable risk is some sort of a defect in a product which cannot be

strict liability should apply to any defective product by stating:
Without extended discussion, it seems obvious that public interest in human
life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and
the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the
profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and
other products, where the defective condition makes them unreasonably
dangerous to the user, as they are in food cases.
42. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
43. See supra note 41 for the Suvada court's policy rationales for the imposition
of strict liability. Dean Prosser. lists public safety and- the enterprise theory as two of
the strongest arguments in favor of strict liability. Additionally, Dean Prosser
advances court efficiency as a strong argument in favor of strict liability. Without
strict liability, a plaintiff and the courts might have to wade through several warranty
actions and perform some legal gymnastics to avoid the privity problem. Prosser,
supra note 23, at 1122-24.
In addition, Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (no other justices concurred in
24
Cal.
Co.,
this opinion), puts forth a "risk-spreading" argument. Justice Traynor supports strict
liability on the basis that "[tihe cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business."
44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
45. For criticism of Cunningham, see infra note 60 and accompanying text,
and see infra note 59.
46. The theory of a mismanufacturing case in strict liability is that the defendant
should be held liable for any injuries caused by his product because he introduced a
defective product into the stream of commerce. See supra note 8.
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245

detected 47 with the methods and technology available at the time the

product was made. The manufacturer may try to assert that he should

not be held liable for a manufacturing defect which could not be
detected.
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,48 is the cornerstone

Illinois decision in the specific area of state of the art evidence as a

defense to strict liability. In Cunningham, a woman was given a blood
transfusion in the defendant hospital. Unfortunately, the blood was

contaminated with the serum hepatitis virus and the woman fell ill to

the virus. As a result she had to endure further hospitalization and
permanent disability. The defendants claimed the technological state
of the art of "manufacturing" blood for transfusions simply could
not detect serum hepatitis,49 thus they should not be held liable under
a strict liability standard.
The court in Cunningham disagreed with the defendants. The
court choose to read the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A (2)
(a).5 0 The court in Cunningham found that to allow state of the art

evidence as a defense would "emasculate the doctrine [of strict

liability] and in a very real sense would signal a return to a negligence
theory."'" In addition the court specifically rejected the notion of
using the undiscoverability of the risk as a defense. The court cited
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 comment g (1965). Inspection by a
manufacturer of the raw materials and component parts of a product as well as the
product itself may be required to determine whether the finished product is reasonably
safe.
2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
48. 47 I11.
49. Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 453-54, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (2)(a) (1965). Special Liability
of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in
Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller.
51. Cunningham, 47 11.2d at 453-54, 266 N.E.2d at 902.If the court had
allowed state of the art evidence on the undiscoverability of the risk as a defense,
the admission of the evidence would shift the focus of the case away from the
defective product itself, the focus of a strict liability theory, onto the manner and
circumstances in which the defective product was made, the focus of a negligence
theory.
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several cases where the claimed defense of the undiscoverability of a
defect in a can of meat or a wrapped candy bar, "or in a bottled
drink,. . . or typhoid bacilli in clams." was disallowed.12 In short, the
court held as a matter of law the defense of undiscoverable risk was
unavailable. 3
In the most controversial part of the opinion the court in Cunningham rejected the defendant's claim that comment k (of § 402A)5 4
exception to strict liability should apply to the Cunningham case and
provide a complete defense to the strict liability claim. 5 The defendants in Cunningham attempted to analogize the serum hepatitis contaminated blood used in Mrs. Cunningham's transfusion with the
Pasteur rabies vaccine. The Pasteur treatment is specifically mentioned
in comment k as an example of a situation in which the unavoidably
unsafe products (comment k) exemption to- strict liability should
52. Id. at 454, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
53. Id. at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903. The court made it quite clear that the
undiscoverability of the risk was irrelevant to the claim, "we believe that whether or
not defendant can, even theoretically, ascertain the existence of serum hepatitis virus
in whole blood employed by it for transfusion purposes is of absolutely no moment."
Id.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A comment k (1965). Unavoidably
unsafe products:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since
the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot
legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety or perhaps even of purity of ingredients,
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
55. Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 455-56, 266 N.E.2d at 903-04.
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apply.16 The court drew a distinction between the Pasteur treatment

for rabies and the serum hepatitis virus present in the blood used in
the transfusion in Cunningham. The court in Cunningham found
comment k only applies to "pure" products for which "the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified." 57 The court in Cunningham classified the Pasteur treatment as a "pure" product which
even with proper production could still cause harm to the user, while

the court classified the blood as being "impure" because of the

contaminating hepatitis virus.,8 In other words, the Pasteur vaccine is

a "pure" product, thus qualifying for the comment k exception to

strict liability, because it is the vaccine itself which may prove dangerous to a patient. However, blood is an "impure" product thus not

qualifying for comment k treatment because it is not the blood itself
which may prove harmful but the contaminating serum hepatitis virus
which may cause an injury. The court drew a very fine distinction

between two arguably unavoidably unsafe products; the "pure" Pas-

teur vaccine as distinguished from the "impure" blood.
This "fine distinction" has been widely criticized. 9 In Hines v.
St. Joseph's HospitalI° the court severely attacked the Cunningham
decision. The court in Hines stated, "the Cunningham court conveniently ignored a part of the Restatement's comment which refuted

its own contention." 6' The court in Hines commented further that the
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 54.
57. Id. See also Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 449, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
58. Id. at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
59. For other criticism of Cunningham, see Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 127
N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); Note, A

Hospital is Strictly Liable for Transfusions of Hepatitus-Infected Blood-Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1172, 1181-82 (1971); Note, Strict
Liability for Disease Contracted from Blood Transfusions, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 80,
88-90 (1971); Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitus in Blood Transfusions, 32 OHIo
ST. L.J. 585, 597-98 (1971); Note, Strict Liability in Tort Held Applicable in Suit by
Patient Against Hospital for Injuries Received from Transfusion of Defective Blood,
24 VAND. L. REV. 645, 653 (1971); Note, Transfusion of Blood Which Contains
Hepatitus Virus is a Sale and Hospital is Strictly Liable in Tort for Resultant Injury
to Patient, 16 VILL. L. REv. 983, 1002-03 (1971).
60. Hines v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (N.M. Ct.

App. 1974), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974). The fact pattern in the
Hines case is very similar to the fact pattern in the Cunningham case. During July
of 1970, at St. Joseph's Hospital, Tommie Hines received a blood transfusion. During
September of 1970, Tommie underwent treatment for serum hepatitus. Tommie
contracted serum hepatitus from the blood used in the transfusion. The court denied
the Hines strict liability claim by using the comment k exception to strict liability.
61. Id. at 1077. The Hines court was referring to the following portion
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court in Cunningham avoided any sort of a risk/benefit analysis and
condemned "a large segment of products" to be sacrificed to strict
liability and ignores the social benefits of those products. 62 One must
consider whether the court in Hines reasoned that the imposition of
strict liability on products such as blood, through the narrow Illinois
interpretation of comment k, would impede the marketing of such
products. The court in Hines might have anticipated that denying
comment k strict liability protection to beneficial products, such as
blood, might curtail the distribution of these beneficial products to
the public. This could be why the court in Hines was so anxious to
implement a risk/benefit analysis. 3
On the other hand, the court in Hines engaged in creating some
fine distinctions of its own, specifically in its treatment of which
products qualify for the comment k exception to strict product
liability. Comment k states that it should apply to "new or experimental drugs." 64 This raises the question, is blood a "new or experimental drug?" The court in Hines reasoned blood was not a "new
or experimental drug," stating "blood cannot be considered a 'new
or experimental drug'. ' 65 The opinion futher stated that blood nevertheless qualifies for the comment k exception under the heading of
"new", in that "it is new in the sense that no adequate test had been
devised to detect the hepatitis virus and even if detected, there is no
process to destroy it without damage to the blood." ' 66 The court in
Hines would hold the fact that the risk was undiscoverable by the
state of the art technology as sufficient to exempt a product from
strict liability. The court in Hines seems to have changed comment
k's definition of what constitutes a "new or experimental" drug.
Comment k discusses providing an exception for drugs which
may harbor undiscoverable defects, as long as the drug is new in the
sense that it may be dangerous "because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience" necessary to create a safe
of comment k:
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience,
there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients,
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
62. Hines, 527 P.2d at 1077.

63. Id.
64.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

65. Hines, 527 P.2d at 1077.
66. Id.

§ 402A comment k (1965).
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drug. 67 Comment k provides an exception for drugs which are truly
"new or experimental." Comment k does not provide an exception
for all drugs which may harbor an undiscoverable risk, without regard
to the time a particular drug may have been in use and the opportunities for medical experience with the drug.
Balancing tests are not a part of strict liability. 68 Proof required
under the theory of strict liability is that the injury or damage resulted
from a "condition of the product," "and that the condition existed
at the time it left the manufacturer's control." ' 69 Under the decision
of the court in Hines an argument could be made to exclude any
product from strict liability for which the cause of injury was an
undiscoverable risk. 70 The court in Hines opens gates for the emasculation of strict liability7' as a result of pursuing the social policy of
7
promoting the development of some socially beneficial drugs.
The court in Hines treats the area of undiscoverable risk differently than Illinois. The court in Cunningham denied the defense of
undiscoverable risk for strict product liability for policy reasons.
These policy reasons are that: First, the court in Cunningham attempted to preserve the doctrine of strict liability;73 second, the policy
of risk spreading, imposing the loss on the one who reaps the profit
75
and creates the risk; 74 and third, the policy of accident minimization.
The spectre of strict liability might very well force industry to develop
new methods and technologies to detect risks, such as serum hepatitis,
67. See supra note 61.

68. Spradely, supra note 11, at 384, 385.
69. Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. Nave v. Rainbow Tire, 123
Ill. App. 3d 585, 591, 462 N.E.2d 620, 624 (1984). The court in Nave did not consider
due care or balancing tests. In the Nave case Robert J. Nave was killed when the
right front tire of his truck blew out causing the truck to run into a tree, killing Mr.
Nave. The court in Nave held that the due care of the manufacturer of the tire was
irrelevant and the only question of substance was whether the product was in a
defective condition when it left the manufacturer.
70. The defective product would have to claim to be within the Hines opinion's
definition of a "new" product. That is, the defendant manufacturer would have to
show that the product's defect was undiscoverable with available knowledge and
without destroying the product. Hines, 527 P.2d 1075.
71. Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
72. See supra note 51.
73. Cunningham, 47 Ill. 2d at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
74. Suvada, 32 Ill. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.

75. Rheingold, Products Liability: The EthicalDrug Manufacturer'sLiability,

18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 1015 (1964). Rheingold discusses the possibility of a drug
manufacturer testing and producing drugs with greater care, to eliminate dangers to
consumers, to avoid any strict liability claims.
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rather than allowing manufacturers to rest secure in their immunity
from strict liability by the grace of the undiscoverable risk.7 6 Most
importantly, Illinois has not sacrificed socially beneficial products,
such as blood, to strict product liability, but rather, Illinois has placed
the task of creating exemptions to strict liability upon the legislature. 77
A good example of the Illinois position on strict product liability
is the Cunningham case. Illinois courts treated comment k narrowly,
thus leaving the making of exceptions to strict liability in specific
cases up to the legislature. The Illinois legislature promptly responded
to Cunningham with a statute limiting the imposition of liability to
the transfusion of blood, plasma and the like to "instances of
negligence or willful misconduct.7 1
Illinois has continued to support the Cunningham view of undiscoverable risk. That is, the issue of the undiscoverability of a product's
defect due to insufficient technology or knowledge is not relevant to
a strict liability mismanufacturing case. 79 Illinois seems to be treating
the undiscoverable risk issue in the most desirable way available, by
not allowing the defense of undiscoverable risk. Illinois as a result
protects the innocent consumer while balancing the need to protect
necessary and beneficial products, such as blood, by providing specific
legislative exceptions to strict liability.80
76. Rheingold, supra note 75, at 1015-17.
77. Leaving the task of creating an exception to strict liability to the legislature
is not unique to Illinois. Russel, 196 So.2d at 121 (Roberts, J., special concurrence),
the court stated that, "the creation of an exemption to the strict liability rule should
be undertaken by the Legislature rather than the courts."
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 5101-5103 (1979). The legislature declared
as a matter of public policy that the "imposition of liability without fault" was
detrimental to "sound medical judgment."
79. Nave, 123 Ill.
App. 3d at 591-92, 462 N.E.2d at 625 (see supra note 69).
Robertson v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 11, 16, 462 N.E.2d 706,
710 (1984). The court in Robertson cited Cunningham and applied Cunningham's
holding that a manufacturer's knowledge of a product defect is irrelevant to a
mismanufacturing strict liability claim and denied the need for a manufacturer's
knowledge of a product defect in a misdesign case (see supra note 20). Matthews v.
Stewart Warner Corp., 20 Ill.
App. 3d 470, 482, 314 N.E.2d 683, 692 (1974). The
court in Matthews used Cunningham, and Suvada, to deny admission of state of the
art evidence of "zerk" manufacturing, as a defense to a strict liability mismanufacturing claim. Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill.
App. 3d 604, 607, 295 N.E.2d
110, 113 (1973). The court in Gelsumino upheld Cunningham and ignored any
evidence concerning the conduct of the defendant and focused on the product's
defectiveness, in a strict liability mismanufacturing claim.Rucker v. Norfolk and
Western Railway Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 770, 779, 381 N.E.2d 715, 724 (1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 77 Il1. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979) (see supra note 15).
80. The Illinois method of treating undiscoverable risk would seem to be more
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IV. UNKNOWABLE RISK
In Illinois, unknowable risk evidence is admissible as a defense
to a strict liability claim."s In the area of unknowable risk Illinois may
have been better served by disallowing the defense of unknowable
risk, just as Illinois disallowed the defense of undiscoverable risk in
the Cunningham decision. Unknowable risk is a close cousin of
undiscoverable risk, yet they are different and have received different
treatment. An undiscoverable risk case exists where the risk of the
product is known, yet the defect is undetectable.8 2 By contrast, in an
unknowable risk case the defect was not even known to have existed
and the defect turns out to be an unfortunate surprise for all parties
involved. 3 In the undiscoverable defect case the plaintiff accuses the
defendant of a manufacturing defect. However, in an unknowable
risk case the plaintiff accuses the defendant of failing to warn the
consumer about the risk of the product. In such a case the defendant
might try to enter state of the art evidence in his defense. The
defendant will claim he cannot be held liable for failing to warn about
a risk of which it was impossible for him to have knowledge.
In an Illinois decision, Woodill v. Parke Davis s4 a defendant
manufacturer was able to thwart a strict liability claim by using the
defense of unknowable risk. In the Woodill case a drug was administered to a mother during the delivery of her baby. The drug Pitocin
was the alleged cause of the newborn's extensive birth defects. The
parents sued asserting the theory of strict liability on behalf of the
minor child. The parents claimed "that defendants' failure to warn
physicians and patients of the danger of using Pitocin while a fetus
is in high station" rendered the drug "not reasonably safe." 5 The
defendants countered with the claim that they could not be held liable
for an unknowable risk.
In Woodill the court held for the defendants, stating, "[tihe
imposition of a knowledge requirement is a proper limitation to place
desirable than the Hines method (see supra note 60 and accompanying text). The
Hines method would protect the manufacturer first and "emasculate" strict liability.
The court in Hines gives poor treatment to the policy rationale of public safety by
taking from the public the chief protector of their safety: strict liability. Thus, the
Hines position would seem to be less desirable than the Illinois position.
81. See infra note 86 and accompanying test.
82. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
83. Comment, Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable Risk, 57
MARQ. L. REV. 660, 661 (1974).
84. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 I11.2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
85. Id. at 29, 402 N.E.2d at 195.
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on a manufacturer's strict liability in tort predicated upon a failure
to warn of a danger inherent in a product. 8 6 In short, the court in
Woodill, by imposing the requirement that the manufacturer must
have knowledge of the product defect to be found liable in a failure

to warn strict liability case, allowed state of the art evidence of
unknowable risk to be admitted and used as a complete defense.
In making the decision to allow state of the art evidence of

unknowable risk as a defense the court in Woodill relied heavily upon
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment j.87 The court
held that the language in comment jss required a knowledge to be
included in a strict product liability failure to warn case.8 9
The court in Woodill also provided a large amount of Illinois

case law which supports their conclusion. 90 The Mahr v. G.D. Searle

Id.

86. Id. at 33-34, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965):
Directions or warning:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the
seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to
its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies,
as for example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not
required to warn against them. Where, however, the product contains an
ingredient to which a substantial number of the population are allergic, and
the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is
one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product,
the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or by
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should
have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. Likewise
in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons,
warning as to use may be required.
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or
ingredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when
consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of time, when the
danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized. Again
the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example, as are also those of
foods containing such substances as saturated fats, which may over a period
of time have a deleterious effect upon the human heart.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will
be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe
for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.

88. Id. specifically a warning is needed if, "he [the manufacturer] has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should
have knowledge [of the risk]."
89. Woodill, 79 IIl. 2d at 33, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
90. See id. at 28, 402 N.E.2d at 197. But see id. at 32, 402 N.E.2d at 201.
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and Co.91 decision supports the Woodill decision to allow unknowable
risk as a defense to a failure to warn strict product liability claim. In
Mahr, Sandra Brewer was taking Enovid, an oral contraceptive, which
was manufactured by the defendant G.D. Searle. Sandra began taking
Enovid one month after the birth of her son in 1963. By January 28,
1967, Sandra had died as a result of several strokes. Sandra's strokes
occurred as a result of "an occlusion of the left internal coratid artery
caused by the regular ingestion of Enovid." 92 The plaintiff sued Searle
on the theory that Searle provided an inadequate warning of the
dangers of Enovid and should be strictly liable for the injury caused
by the defective product. The court in Mahr found for the defendants.
The court concluded that Searle had no knowledge of the defect
present in Enovid and thus could not be found liable. The court
stated "a prerequisite to the duty to warn is proof that the use of the
involved drug subjects a user to risk of injury" (i.e. the risk of injury
must be known). 93
In another case supporting the Woodill decision, Stanfield v.
Medalist Industries, Inc. 94 Ossie Stanfield lost three fingers while
operating a cutting and boring machine for General Electric Cabinet
Co. Ossie claimed she should be compensated for her injuries because
the machine had inadequate warnings of its dangerous nature. The
court in Stanfield would not hold the manufacturer strictly liable until
the court had determined whether Medalist Industries, the defendant,
had knowledge of the machine's dangerous nature. In the Stanfield
decision the court stated, "if a manufacturer knows or should know
that danger may result from a particular use of his product, the
product may be held to be in a defective condition if sold without
adequate warnings."9
The Stanfield and Mahr cases both support the Woodill opinion's
imposition of the knowledge requirement of the product's defect, by
the manufacturer, for a strict liability failure to warn claim. In other
words, both cases support the defense of unknowable risk.
The court in Woodill supported its position of requiring a manufacturer's knowledge of the product's defect by denying that the
knowledge requirement will reduce strict liability to a negligence
standard. The court in Woodill stated that the knowledge requirement
focuses attention on the product and its propensities and not on the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Mahr v. G.D. Searle and Co., 72 I11.App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214 (1979).
Id. at 547, 390 N.E.2d at 1219.
Id. at 563, 390 N.E.2d at 1230.
Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, 34 Iil. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975).
Id. at 639, 340 N.E.2d at 279.
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conduct of the manufacturer. 96 The court in Woodill reasoned that
the imposition of strict liability in a failure to warn of an unknowable
risk would render the warning itself "meaningless." That is, if a
manufacturer could be found liable for failing to warn the consumer
against a defect of which the manufacturer was ignorant, the manufacturer may try to warn against any conceivable risk. Such a "boilerplate" warning would carry little value. 97 The court in Woodill also
put forth another supporting policy reason for the unknowable risk
defense, which is the need to put some limit on the manufacturer's
liability so the manufacturer will not become the "virtual insurer of
the product." 98
The Woodill opinions view of the proper treatment of state of
the art evidence of an unknowable risk in a failure to warn case is
not a universally accepted view. Presenting a contrary holding to the
Woodill decision is Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co. 99 In
Jackson, a painter was severely burned by combustion of the fumes
of the defendant's epoxy paint. The plaintiff claimed there was an
inadequate warning on the paint can of the extremely flammable
nature of the product and sued under a theory of strict liability. On
the issue of the knowledge requirement of the manufacturer, in an
inadequate warning case, the court in Jackson stated, "[iun strict
liability it is of no moment what [the] defendant had reason to believe.
Liability arises from selling any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."'' 0 Examining the
conduct of the manufacturer through what he knows or should have
known instead of looking at the product itself seems to have reduced
strict liability into a negligence theory. 011 The majority in Woodill
96. Woodill, 79 I11.
2d at 30, 402 N.E.2d at 199. By disclaiming any interference
with strict liability the Woodill court can avoid the accompanying social policy
rationales for imposing strict liability on a manufacturing of a defective product.
97. Id. at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 200.
98. Id. at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199. If the court did not require the knowledge
element the court in Woodill claimed it would be forcing the manufacturer to be
absolutely liable for his products.
99. 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
100. Id. at 812.
101. Id. at 812. See Woodill, 79 I11.
2d at 31, 32, 402 N.E.2d at 200, 201
(Moran, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Cunningham, 47 I11.
2d at 449, 266
N.E.2d at 903.
For a further example of the virtual abolishing of strict liability and the creation
of a negligence standard in failure to warn cases by allowing the un-knowable risk
defense, compare the majority's requirements for a proof of "strict liability" in
Woodill with the requirements for a proof of liability under the negligence standard
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disregards the basic policy reasons behind the imposition of strict
liability; loss minimization, 10 2 and the policy rationales of the court
03
inSuvada.1
A jurisdiction may adopt one of three alternatives with respect
to the unknowable risk defense. First, allow the defense, in which
case the court would use a negligence analysis;' °4 second, treat the
05
evidence as irrelevant and face the possibility of absolute liability;
or third, use an intermediate approach where the court would use
some sort of a risk/benefit analysis.' °6
Illinois could be heading in the wrong direction in it's treatment
of unknowable risks. In allowing the abandonment of strict liability,
by allowing the defense of unknowable risk, Illinois is granting
manufacturers an unassailable position. As long as the manufacturer
can sustain a lack of knowledge about the possible risks of his
products, the manufacturer is safe from liability. Allowing the unknowable risk defense may be an effective incentive for encouraging
the development of new drugs, however, allowing the defense is also
a disincentive to aggressively investigating the effects of a new product. 10 7 Certainly it is socially beneficial to promote the development
1 but, allowing the unknowable risk defense may not
of new drugs, '1
be the best way to proceed."°9
The denial of the unknowable risk defense would not be tantamount to absolute liability. The plaintiffs in a failure to warn strict
liability claim would still have to prove "that their injury of damage
resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). For an example of § 388 as a
negligence standard see Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 177-78
(3rd Cir. 1976). See also Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 464-465 (5th
Cir. 1976).
102. RHEINGOLD, supra note 75, at 1015-17.
103. Suvada, 32 11. 2d at 618-19, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The policy reasons are;
first, public safety; second, the manufacturer invites the use of the product and
represents that it is safe for use; third, the justice of imposing the loss on "those
who have created the risk and reaped the profit" from the product.
104. Woodill, 79 Ill. 2d at 38-39, 402 N.E.2d at 200 (Moran, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
105. Woodill, 79 Ill. 2d at 37, 402 N.E.2d 199.
106. Spradely, supra note 11, at 390. In the risk/benefit analysis approach a
"needed" product would face a small possibility of liability as a result of an unknown
risk, while an "unnecessary" product would not be able to avail itself of the unknown
risk defense at all.
107. RHEINOOLD, supra note 75, at 1015-17.
108. Woodill, 79 Ill. 2d at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
109. RHEINGOLD, supra note 75, at 1015-17.
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unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time
it left the manufacturer's control." 1 0 Furthermore, while the imposition of strict liability would further social policy interests," '' there
would be opportunities to exempt specific socially beneficial areas
from strict liability by legislative action. 1 12 The most desirable treatment of state of the art evidence of unknowable risk for Illinois
would seem to be the opposite of the current Illinois position. That
is, if Illinois followed the judicial strategy the Illinois courts used in
the undiscoverable risk situations, i.e., the Cunningham line of cases,
the state would be insuring public safety while still encouraging
"needed" or rare drug production.
V.

CONCLUSION

State of the art evidence of undiscoverable risk is not admissible
as a defense in a strict liability mismanufacturing claim in Illinois.
The court in Cunningham set this precedent and subsequent Illinois
courts have followed the decision. The Cunningham decision was
based on sound social policy rationales designed to benefit both the
consumer and the manufacturer while preserving strict product liability in Illinois.
However, the court in Woodill ruled that state of the art evidence
is admissible, in Illinois, as a defense in a strict liability lack of a
proper warning claim. The court in Woodill based it's decision on
policy rationales designed almost solely to benefit the manufacturer
and ignored protecting the consumer and strict liability.
Illinois would perhaps best be served by using the Cunningham
decision as precedent on the admissability of any type of state of the
art evidence intended as a defense to a strict liability claim.
JAMES CHRISTENSEN

110. Suvada, 32 I11.2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.

111. See supra note 103.
112. See supra note 77.

